I have had this op-ed in mind for a couple of weeks now, as it addresses some rhetoric that I have seen quite often. My sense of urgency in getting it out only increased in light of its sentiment being echoed by an actual NHL team executive. A recent quote from Philadelphia Flyers president of hockey operations Keith Jones had him effectively opine that he was pleased with the number of picks that the team had in the first two rounds, as it gave them another opportunity to try to find another Matvei Michkov. This, along with his espoused idea last year that there was talent in every round of the draft, indicated two years in a row that the Flyers were/are content to use as much of their draft stock as possible on selections rather than using the picks as trade chips (not to say the latter didn’t happen at all in 2024, but the amount/form of activity that occurred in that vein left something to be desired). This is predicated upon a fundamental misunderstanding about how much utility there is throughout most of the draft in even finding so much as NHLers, much less stars, MUCH less finding a prospect of Matvei Michkov’s caliber. Unfortunately, many hockey fans out there (I will not limit this to just one team’s fanbase) are prone to eating up this level of excitement around a draft throughout its proceedings. I do not claim to have the answers as to why such a thought is so prevalent, but I can illustrate why this is obviously an unreasonably high level of optimism. However, this may also be a very multifaceted, complex exploration, as many answers seem to raise more questions. Indeed, this final product is much more multidimensional and mixed method than I originally envisioned.

One subject I have been contemplating recently is if the 2003 NHL Entry Draft, which nearly was a “talent in every round” class (even if it did calm down a bit at times, such as in rounds two and three), colored the perception of many about classes can be. This would likely be especially true for those who were there for its proceedings and seeing the entirety of the fruits that it bore, but its legacy also is still impacting the landscape of hockey today. Four players from the draft are still active in the NHL as of the 2024-25 season in the form of Brent Burns, Marc-Andre Fleury, Corey Perry, and Ryan Suter, with several more only recently calling it a career such as Joe Pavelski (arguably the draft’s best unexpected success story given his selection at 205th overall and his long, accomplished career afterwards), Jeff Carter, and Patrice Bergeron. The class also very recently had its first Hall of Famer enshrined by way of Shea Weber. More to the core of the point, though, this class produced a plethora of NHLers which was absolutely absurd by the standard of any draft in any era. All thirty players selected in round one played at least two NHL games, with only three being sub-200 gamers. Bear in mind, the bar for a standard, respectable NHL career is 200 games played. Considering that, it is worth noting that a number of players selected on day two, in addition to the impressive strike rate of 27/30 on day one, surpassed that bar. All told, a total of 69 players across 292 selections passed this threshold (with one additional selection, 22nd overall pick Marc-Antoine Pouliot, one of those aforementioned three “misses” from round one, coming close at 192).

I got curious to see how the average draft class performance was between 2010 and 2021 in contrast with 2003. There are some limitations considering dev curves, particularly by player position, as well as the fact that, despite the league having more teams now, the draft is shorter than it once was (292 selections across nine rounds being whittled down to 224 in seven rounds in 2021). However, when looking it at from a percentages standpoint, we might be able to gain some perspective. 2022 is excluded due to not having had any 200 gamers yet (as of right now, only four players – Juraj Slafkovsky, Logan Cooley, Pavel Mintyukov, and Kevin Korchinski – have played at least a full season’s worth of games) and obviously, doing so would be impossible for the two most recent classes. I anticipate that this should provide some context as to why this sort of thinking is not fruitful. Credit to Elite Prospects for having a tool allowing me to view each draft and sort by games played to make this process easy:

2010: 58

2011: 58

2012: 59

2013: 53

2014: 54

2015: 62

2016: 39

2017: 38

2018: 23

2019: 13 (at the time of writing, an additional five players are within 20 GP of this mark; namely: Bowen Byram – 196, Arthur Kaliyev – 188, Cam York – 188, Connor McMichael – 186, Brett Leason – 182)

2020: 8 (current near-hits: J.J. Peterka – 191, Jake Sanderson – 188)

2021: 3 (near-hits: Wyatt Johnston and Owen Power – 195 each)

On a percentage basis, the classes shape up like this:

2003: 69/292 – 23.63%

2010: 58/210 – 27.61%

2011: 58/211 – 27.48%

2012: 59/211 – 27.96%

2013: 55/211 – 25.11%

2014: 54/210 – 25.71%

2015: 62/211 – 29.38%

2016: 39/211 – 18.48%

2017: 38/217 – 17.51%

2018: 23/217 – 10.599%

2019: 13/217 – 5.99% (currently)

2020: 8/217 – 3.688% (currently)

2021: 3/224 – 1.3392% (currently)

It is worth noting that all six classes from 2010-2015 performed better than 2003 from a percentage standpoint. What perhaps jumped out at me the most, however, and gets to the core of the conversation here is the steep drop off between 2015 and 2016, one which the league has yet to recover from. Now, some context is required, of course: Even in the context of having been in an era of mostly good strike rates, 2015 was generational. Alongside the likes of 1979, 1983, 1984, and 2003, it is widely recognized as one of the greatest draft classes ever. That said, it did seem indicative of the beginning of a trend, one that is manifested by fewer lengthy careers and a smaller number of more immediate/quick roster mainstays and I would like to know why. I did also consider the potential limiting factor, spurred by a thought by Derek Dunn of The Liberty Yell, of near-misses from 2016 and 2017 potentially altering the picture. However, there were not many of them. From the class of 2016, only two players got within twenty of the 200 mark, namely Rasmus Asplund and Julien Gauthier at 183 and 181, respectively. In 2017, there are only four “close but not cigar” guys at present: Fabian Zetterlund (198), Mackenzie Entwistle (193), Sebastian Aho [the Swede] (190), and Noah Cates (186). Recency can be a factor when considering all six of these players are still under contract with NHL franchises. However, consider that the Hockey Prospecting model developed by Byron Bader notes that dev paths are considered “ended” upon the conclusion of a player’s D+5 season. Usually, by then, you have a good idea of what a player is and all that he is going to be. So, with that more or less addressed, where have things gone wrong?

We may recall a conversation on an episode of Black Stitch Hockey’s podcast earlier this year wherein Christian discussed the demand there is (both internally and externally) for young guys to push themselves to get to that next level ASAP in light of some of the generational talents that have done “the thing” right away, with agents and executives probably playing into it for money purposes. Those players are not able to handle it and get hurt. Beyond that, we generally are likely getting something wrong with the way we train and prepare young athletes in pro sports. As advanced as sports science and kinesthetics have gotten, it does seem as though minor injuries are on an upward trend, and load management also does not help as we saw with Leo Carlsson last season. Truth be told, there are tons of teams (including Anaheim) who I believe should completely overhaul their player dev, training, and medical staffs because of this, but I digress. In the words of Stan Van Gundy when he addressed this topic in the context of basketball, “something isn’t working,” and as Derek Dunn put it, it may be killing the NHL’s rate of 200 gamers. At minimum, when injuries aren’t occurring, I would say that player dev is sometimes overthought (or undercooked) on grassroots levels, and also is certainly capable of being stagnant at the next one. Anaheim is yet another example of this. Trevor Zegras and Jamie Drysdale almost appear to have their hockey senses dulled down contrasted with what they were at BU/with the US NTDP and in the OHL with Erie, respectively (though Drysdale is perhaps trending in a better direction as of late under the guidance of Brad Shaw with Philadelphia).

Another point of reflection made by Derek was that it is possible that the fast ascendancies of Connor McDavid and Auston Matthews may have encouraged teams to draft “complete athletes” first and foremost. To the credit of those seeking another Michkov, be it for the Flyers or for their own team they support or work for, I, too, see it as a better – and maybe even more useful – aspiration to covet hockey IQ, mechanical skill and puck protection over ridiculously insane outlier athletic ability. Derek worded it in the following way: “I do think Michkov and [Connor] Bedard could be the two that finally counters the phenomenon [that seems to be damaging young careers]. It’s the first time we’ve seen talents of this magnitude that weren’t physically ready to dominate from day 1. So watching these kids get there in years 3 and 4 could change the way people think, especially in light of Jack Hughes as a sort of precursor.” However, these guys are outliers of their own type, and finding their equivalents will be a fool’s errand, particularly in later draft stages (I’d say the latter is most often impossible barring a fluke).

If I were to summarize my findings here, there are a plethora of reasons as to why player dev isn’t panning out in the manner it once did. There are ways around it when prioritizing different things in player evaluation, but those can only do so much. When considering that, nevertheless, your odds of striking gold with your picks, even in round one, are most often not as high as you think, and fixing the mechanisms that cause that isn’t something that’s going to happen overnight. As such, if you are going to stockpile picks and do not have the intention (or the capability) of using at least some of them as trade ammunition or sweetener, in any era, your expectations have to be somewhat tempered, but especially now. The cumulative value of a first round, even on the higher end of it, in most classes can be volatile. The second half is most often much weaker. Day two picks? Most of the time, having high hopes isn’t worth it. This is to say nothing of the counterintuitive nature of having a flooded pipeline with too many prospects with little hopes of making the NHL, which can severely handcuff you. Unless you are just absolutely starved for options and numbers, it simply is not worth it to accumulate a vast number of picks only for the sake of using them all.